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Original Article
Preface
This paper is about moral judgments in challenging and 
uncertain times and how social relationships shape our per-
ceptions of right and wrong. My original goal in writing it 
was to explore a curious gap in the psychological research on 
morality that we often unwittingly incorporate into our soci-
ological work: how situations and perceptions influence 
moral cognition and, in turn, social behavior. I never could 
have imagined how COVID-19 would collapse the distance 
between theory and practice.
Today, as some 85 percent of Americans live under orders 
to shelter-in-place, where even the most banal social interac-
tion could prove a link in a chain of contagion and death, these 
issues feel relevant, urgent, and close. In particular, I begin the 
paper with a summary of two models of moral cognition: the 
social intuitionist model and the digital camera model. The lat-
ter is premised on what is occasionally cheekily referred to as 
“Trolleyology,” after a famous series of experiments where 
participants are confronted with life-and-death decisions. It 
has often been dismissed by those who claim such circum-
stances—where one person is tasked with choosing who lives 
and who dies—are esoteric and unrelatable. Still, as someone 
who studies decision-making about violence, it seemed worth 
sorting through the truths inherent in the scenario. I am devas-
tated by how relevant those truths seem today.  
As I write, there are places in the world where there aren’t 
enough hospital beds or respirators to allow all patients to 
receive adequate medical care. Italian doctors have been 
forced to weigh one life against another. Very soon, their col-
leagues in the United States will face such terrible responsi-
bilities as well. There are no good blueprints for such 
devastating moral decisions. One group of bioethicists pro-
posed that, should equipment or care be rationed, the young 
and those who are front-line health workers must have prior-
ity (Emanuel et al. 2020). State plans in Alabama call for a 
scheme in which “persons with severe or profound mental 
retardation, moderate to severe dementia, or catastrophic 
neurological complications such as persistent vegetative 
state are unlikely candidates for ventilator support.” Doctors 
in Pennsylvania created an eight-point scale, since adopted 
by hospitals around the country, to calculate a patient’s pre-
COVID life expectancy (given any preexisting conditions), 
as well as their likelihood for surviving their current hospi-
talization as physicians sort who will—and who will 
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Abstract
Dual-process theories of morality are approaches to moral cognition that stress the varying significance of emotion 
and deliberation in shaping judgments of action. Sociological research that builds on these ideas considers how cross-
cultural variation alters judgments, with important consequences for what is and is not considered moral behavior. Yet 
lacking from these approaches is the notion that, depending on the situation and relationship, the same behavior by the 
same person can be considered more or less moral. The author reviews recent trends in sociological theorizing about 
morality and calls attention to the neglect of situational variations and social perceptions as mediating influences on 
judgment. She then analyzes the moral machine experiment to demonstrate how situations and relationships inform 
moral cognition. Finally, the author suggests that we can extend contemporary trends in the sociology of morality by 
connecting culture in thinking about action to culture in thinking about people.
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not—get life-saving care (White 2020). Many facilities are 
considering adopting universal do-not-resuscitate orders for 
coronavirus patients because of the risks such efforts might 
pose to hospital staff. These heartbreaking preparations, let 
alone the actual decisions, felt unthinkable not long ago. 
So, I publish this article full of emotion. As I walk my 
neighborhood and see lines of customers outside grocery 
stores, carefully spaced and wearing whatever masks or ban-
danas they might have, I think of the sociological research on 
culture and crisis discussed herein. Situational disruptions 
upend everything, large and small. We may not personally 
have to choose who will live and die, but the sociological 
research on categorization and classification also discussed 
helps us see how, in this time of “social distancing,” we are 
actually being called on to broaden our universe of moral 
obligation (Fein 1993). Everything we do (and don’t do) now 
shapes how many of the gut-wrenching life-or-death deci-
sions doctors and nurses will have to make. The most vulner-
able among us are suddenly more visible: We are deeply 
connected not only to the elderly and the medically compro-
mised, but also the homeless, the incarcerated, the undocu-
mented. Our responses must be altruistic to save as many as 
possible, but they often have not been: We have seen people 
hoard groceries and price-gouge on stockpiles of normally 
cheap and truly vital supplies. Four of 100 U.S. Senators 
(Richard Burr [R-N.C.], Feinstein [D-Calif.], James Inhofe 
[R-Okla.], and Kelly Loeffler [R-GA]), as soon as they were 
briefed on the spread of the novel coronavirus, but before 
that information was public, seized the chance to sell hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in stocks before the market 
could collapse, as they knew it would. 
More than ever, I am convinced we need to think about 
how situational circumstances interact with social relation-
ships to shape moral judgments. This is not a call to moral 
relativism, but an urgent acknowledgement that, when it 
comes to individual judgment, morality is relative. What we 
believe to be good and bad gets a little fuzzier when we find 
ourselves in unfamiliar territory, and so we reconsider our 
relationships, and who and what truly matters. Our theory is 
incomplete without this understanding. 
I welcome all feedback and thank you in advance for tak-
ing the time to read and think broadly.
Aliza Luft
April 5, 2020
I would like to especially thank Letta Page, who helped me to 
compose this preface at the very last minute with her charac-
teristic clarity and thoughtfulness.
Introduction
How do we know when an action is wrong? Research on 
moral judgment suggests that participating in, observing, or 
even thinking about moral violations automatically triggers a 
negative emotional response. As Jonathan Haidt (2007) 
explained with reference to physical violence, “when we 
think about sticking a pin into a child’s hand, or we hear a 
story about a person slapping her father, most of us have an 
automatic intuitive reaction that includes a flash of negative 
affect” (p. 998). Haidt’s argument is premised on a wide 
body of scholarship suggesting that fast and slow cognitive 
processes underlie human cognition and that has become 
increasingly influential in sociology (e.g., Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Kahneman 2011; Lizardo et al. 2016; Miles, Charron-
Chénier, and Schleifer 2019). However, within the cognitive 
sciences, significant advances have been made in recent 
years highlighting Haidt’s inattention to situational varia-
tion—in particular, whether a dilemma is familiar—while a 
separate body of work calls attention to the relationship 
between affect and social perception—how unconsciously 
held beliefs about others shape how we feel about and subse-
quently treat them. As a result, in this article I argue that 
moral judgment is not simply about actions but about situa-
tions and relationships. Moreover, sociologists, who have 
long been attuned to how situations and relationships influ-
ence human judgment, are uniquely poised to consider these 
influences in our analyses. Thus, to complement the growing 
incorporation of research from cognitive sciences into soci-
ology, in this article I provide an update on advances in the 
former and how our own disciplinary expertise can both 
deepen and extend these insights concerning morality.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I review research 
on culture in thinking about action1 with regard to moral 
judgment, highlighting two prominent models in the cogni-
tive sciences: Jonathan Haidt’s social institutionist model 
and Joshua Greene’s digital camera model. The former has 
received significant attention in sociology, but the latter, 
which is highly influential in moral psychology, has not. I 
suggest that the latter is especially worth incorporating into 
our research, as its focus on situational variation mirrors 
much work in our own discipline that emphasizes how social 
situations contain their own meanings and expectations that 
shape people’s judgments and actions. Second, I argue that 
although both these models have made significant contribu-
tions to sociological understandings of the culture-cognition 
nexus, they are flawed because of their neglect of the crucial 
mediating role of social perception. This neglect is evident in 
the experiments that underlie their models, which hinge on 
vignettes in which people are raced, gendered, and otherwise 
classified in ways that sociological research has long identi-
fied as significant for shaping evaluation. Third, I review 
research on social perception to explain the cognitive 
1Importantly, although Vaisey (2009) classified his model as one of 
culture in action, following Lizardo et al. (2016:298–99), I under-
stand his distinction between automatic and deliberate cognition to 
refer to culture in thinking about action. This is because Vaisey did 
not evaluate how people behave but rather how people think about 
their behaviors, which is an important difference and one I adhere 
to in this article as well.
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mechanisms of culture in thinking about people and argue 
that action and perception cannot be divorced. Finally, I 
apply the argument to evaluate the recent “moral machine 
experiment” (Awad et al. 2018) and demonstrate how a soci-
ological approach that combines culture in thinking about 
action with culture in thinking about people can enhance and 
extend this work. In the conclusion I discuss the implications 
of this article and propose directions for future research.
Moral Judgment I: Culture in Thinking 
about Action
In recent years, the idea that emotions guide moral judgment 
has gained prominence thanks to two groundbreaking mod-
els that have emerged in psychology to challenge the 
decades-old assumption that morality is the result of rational 
thought: Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model and 
Joshua Greene’s digital camera model. The former, also 
known as the elephant and rider model,2 proposes that people 
make choices of right and wrong on the basis of strongly felt, 
intuitive reactions to moral dilemmas (type I cognitive pro-
cessing). Moral reasoning is a post hoc process emerging to 
justify the initial affective response (type II cognitive pro-
cessing) (Haidt 2001, 2005, 2007). In the latter, Greene 
counters Haidt’s conception by calling attention to the influ-
ence of situations on moral judgment. According to Greene 
(Greene 2009; Greene et al. 2001), when things are normal 
and operating as expected, type I cognition drives evalua-
tion. Like the preset mode of a camera with fixed settings for 
taking photos in different contexts, type I heuristics offer 
shortcuts by shaping feelings and guiding judgment in nor-
mal times. However, in novel or challenging situations, in 
which the obvious setting is not clear, “our conscious reason-
ing and gut feelings dialogue” and more deliberate adjust-
ments become necessary (Greene 2017:67). The result is 
type II cognition, whereby slow, explicit, and conscious cal-
culations emerge as cognitive manual adjustments. “Moral 
dilemmas vary in the extent to which they engage emotional 
processing,” Greene et al. (2001:2105) wrote, and new and 
complex problems challenge us because our heuristics lack 
the requisite training to guide us.
Haidt’s social intuitionist model has become deeply 
influential in contemporary sociological theories of moral-
ity largely thanks to a now widely cited article by Vaisey 
(2009), who introduced Haidt to a sociological audience. 
According to Vaisey, internalized beliefs and values moti-
vate moral (thinking about) action (see note 1) by providing 
people with implicit understandings of what is good and 
worth striving for or bad and requiring avoidance. Like 
emotions in the social intuitionist model, these internalized 
beliefs guide our judgments unconsciously; they become 
explicit as justifications only when the demands of social 
interaction require. Thus type I cognition is akin to socio-
logical theories of practice whereby embodied dispositions 
guide action (Bourdieu 1984, 1990a; Giddens 1984). On the 
other hand, type II cognition resembles Swidler’s (1986, 
2001) toolkit model in which cultural meanings justify 
action, though for Vaisey, these explicit justifications emerge 
only when people are required to provide them. Vaisey dem-
onstrates his argument by comparing teenagers’ fixed-sur-
vey and in-depth interview responses to questions about 
their values and moral dilemmas and argues that adoles-
cents’ moral intuitions as expressed in surveys better predict 
their future actions than do their explicit answers to inter-
view questions about prosocial and deviant behaviors. He 
concludes that if we wish to understand the influence of 
moral values on action, our research methods must access 
practical type I as opposed to discursive type II conscious-
ness (see also Martin 2010; Vaisey 2014).
Since Vaisey’s publication, there has been a surge in soci-
ological scholarship examining how acquired implicit values 
motivate thinking about action as well as action itself from a 
dual-process perspective (Lizardo et al. 2016). For example, 
macro-level studies compare the relationship between uncon-
scious moral schemas and self-reported behaviors cross-
nationally (Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013; Miles 2015) 
and nationally (Miles 2014b) with regard to voting behavior 
(Johnson et al. 2014) and volunteering (Beyerlein and Vaisey 
2013). At the meso level, studies examine how young adults’ 
changing moral schemas are associated with changes in their 
personal social networks (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010) and how 
largely unconscious views of oneself as independent or col-
laborative influence the likelihood an individual will join a 
boundary-spanning professional network (Srivastava and 
Banaji 2011). Finally, micro-level research considers how 
embodied moral orientations about idealized futures (Frye 
2012), the sacredness of the environment (Farrell 2013), or 
religious-moral values (Winchester 2016) shape individual 
behaviors. In each of these examples, the main idea is that 
implicit type I value commitments drive judgments and 
actions and explicit type II thinking emerges after the fact, 
and only when prompted, to explain behavioral choices.
Situational Variations
Despite the important contributions of this work, sociologi-
cal scholarship has tended to prioritize embodied moral val-
ues as independently shaping action without attending to 
how situational variations influence the judgment-action 
dynamic, especially situations with novel and unfamiliar 
features (but see Farrell 2014). To be sure, one of the most 
significant contributions of sociology to the psychological 
research on morality is attention to contextual-framed-as-
cultural variation in what gets classified as moral: when and 
why, and by whom (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013; Lamont et al. 
2017). But often, this cultural variation is conceptualized as 
2I do not discuss the elephant and rider analogy, as it has been 
described for a sociological audience previously in Vaisey’s (2009) 
influential article.
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static: two or more social groups’ values are compared as if 
individual group members’ moral judgment processes are 
unaffected by situational contexts and contingency. In other 
words, there is a tendency to treat culture as geography by 
comparing cross-nationally or as sociodemography by com-
paring across social categories and less attention to culture 
as features of situations that may lead to intragroup or even 
intra-individual variation (but see Miles 2014a; Schilke and 
Rossman 2018; Stets and Carter 2012).3 Yet, as many social 
theorists have noted (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966; 
Collins 2004; Garfinkel 1964; Goffman 1959, 1961; Mead 
1934), and as a wide body of research has demonstrated 
since (see below), the features of situations shape judgments 
and actions as each situation contains its own meanings and 
expectations, sometimes even built in the process of interac-
tion itself. Even our social identities are situationally situ-
ated as different aspects of our selves can be rendered more 
or less relevant depending on features of the situation 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000:14; Rippon et al. 2014:4–5, in 
Pitts-Taylor 2016:34), shaping implicit judgment in turn 
(Xiao and Van Bavel 2019).
Subsequently, and building on a pioneering article by 
DiMaggio (1997), a wide and separate body of research on 
culture and cognition examines how different features of 
situations shape judgments and actions. This includes fea-
tures of the physical environment such as the setting one is 
in (e.g., a park, a church, on the street; Shepherd 2011:129) 
and characteristics of the setting including its sounds 
(Schwarz 2015) and smells (Cerulo 2018). It also includes 
features of the material environment: how the material 
qualities of objects shape the meanings people attribute to 
situations (e.g., Griswold, Mangione, and McDonnell 2013; 
Klett 20144; Martin 2011; McDonnell 2010; Mukerji 1994; 
Zubrzycki 2013). Interactional features of situations matter, 
too, including both verbal and nonverbal communication: 
language, voice, accents, intonation, grammar, touch, 
bodily signals, and gestures, to name a few (Alex 2008; 
Ignatow 2007; Lembo forthcoming; Martin 2010). Finally, 
features of the social environment that shape judgment and 
action include observations of the behaviors of others 
(Paluck and Shepherd 2012; Shepherd and Paluck 2015), 
which depend on the network characteristics of one’s rela-
tionships (Shepherd 2017), as well as on the social 
characteristics of the actors involved, a crucial feature of 
any situation that includes human beings, real or imagined, 
and to which I return below. Combined, physical, material, 
interactional, and social features of situations can be classi-
fied as forms of “public culture” that provide knowledge 
about the world in ways that are informational and mean-
ingful, depending, always, on a given receivers’ “personal 
culture”: internal cognitive associations developed through 
repeat embodied experience (Lizardo 2017; Patterson 2014; 
Strauss and Quinn 1997).5 To the extent that individuals’ 
personal cultures resonate with features of the situations 
they encounter, they are able to “solve” practical problems 
and move smoothly through the world (McDonnell, Bail, 
and Tavory 2017).
What happens, then, when actors lack the requisite per-
sonal culture needed to make sense of the situation they are 
in? In other words, what happens when people find them-
selves in novel and unfamiliar situations: places with strange 
sounds and smells, where people speak different languages 
and use foreign gestures? Or settings with unfamiliar 
objects, or where the material qualities of objects have sud-
denly changed? And what about those situations in which 
networks and patterns of interactions are disarrayed, or in 
which people are not who you once thought them to be? At 
the micro level, these are precisely the kinds of situations 
Swidler (1986, 2001) referred to as “unsettled,” that are 
characterized by breakdowns in “taken-for-granted exter-
nalized cultural scaffolding” (Swidler 1986:278–79), and 
that Vaisey (2009:1707) suggested, toward the end of his 
article, “might favor different mixes of schematic and delib-
erative processing” (p. 1707). Nascent research on culture 
and cognition demonstrates that in such situations, type I 
cognition is inadequate.
For example, Stoltz and Taylor (2017) examined news-
paper reports of people trying to protest by paying with 
large amounts of small cash and coins and found that 
these actions trigger strong reactions because they violate 
the taken-for-granted meaning of money. By using a 
familiar object in an unfamiliar way, money suddenly 
comes to require conscious attention and effortful inter-
pretation, amplifying emotions. Similarly, and also with 
reference to materiality, Rawlings and Childress (2019) 
showed how when actors in book clubs are confronted 
with new cultural objects—in this case, a brand new 
novel—they actively work to determine its shared mean-
ing by interacting with similar others. Through these 
interactions, the meaning of the book comes to reflect 
3In fact, even Haidt (2012) evaluated responses to his vignettes in 
the United States and Brazil and among respondents from high and 
low social classes.
4Importantly, both Schwarz (2015) and Klett (2014) wrote about 
sound as an environmental feature that shapes the meaning that people 
attribute to situations. In the former, however, sound is a background 
feature of the physical environment whereby the “sonic styles” of dif-
ferent neighborhoods serve to mark difference. In the latter, sound 
refers to “situations with an overt sonic goal.” Although Klett asserted 
that his argument is not limited to settings with intentionally produced 
noise, I believe it helpful to separate the two for theoretical clarity.
5Personal culture can be further subdivided into its declarative and 
nondeclarative forms (Lizardo 2017). Also, in a slightly different 
iteration of this relationships, Wood et al. (2018) defined situational 
assemblages of public culture as “frames” and internalized personal 
culture as “schemas.” Whether any particular feature of public cul-
ture evokes a meaning depends on whether it activates a schema in 
a receiver (see also Hunzaker and Valentino 2019).
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sociodemographic differences, but it did not start out this 
way. Given the novelty of the text, book club members’ 
cultural dispositions were insufficient for guiding their 
judgments. Explicit deliberation through interaction was 
required.
Each of these examples is of a situation in which only one 
feature of the environment was unfamiliar—what Lizardo 
and Strand (2010:214–20) referred to as small “gaps” in the 
usual “ontological complicity” between embodied disposi-
tions and the external environment. Elsewhere, Foster 
(2018:151) described these as “conditions of mild uncer-
tainty” whereby people deliberately rely on “practices avail-
able in memory or [other aspects of] the cultural environment” 
to discern a strategy of action.
In contrast, and in a separate stream of research, the socio-
logical research on crisis considers situational disruptions on 
a much grander scale: total and unexpected structural col-
lapse. These are situations with “unstable” and “nonexistent” 
cultural scaffolding (Lizardo and Strand 2010:216, 219–20), 
in which sudden ruptures cause a break in routine practice 
and an indeterminacy of outcomes. Such situations force 
consciousness to the foreground as actors struggle to find a 
way forward (Ermakoff 2008, 2010, 2013; Kurzman 2004; 
Reed 2016; Sewell 1996).6 They are also especially emo-
tional as the disruption caused by crisis can sow fear, confu-
sion, and insecurity. Yet precisely because routine practices 
cannot provide guidance, emotions are insufficient to lead 
the way (Ermakoff 2017). Even Bourdieu with Wacquant 
wrote that “rational choice may take over” in “times of cri-
sis” when “the routine adjustment of subjective and objec-
tive structures is brutally disrupted”—rational choice, in this 
sense, referring to nonhabitual and explicit problem-solving 
(quoted in Ermakoff 2010:541, 2013:89).7 Hence, even the 
“founder” of practice theory proposed that intentional delib-
eration is required in situations in which public culture is 
disarrayed (Ermakoff 2010, 2013).
These examples suggest that it is important for sociolo-
gists who use dual-process theories of cognition to attend to 
how features of situations, settled or unsettled, affect moral 
judgment and action. As individuals move through the world, 
they encounter various forms of public culture that structure 
the meanings of situations as morally good, morally bad, or 
morally neutral, depending on their preexisting dispositions. 
Yet in novel, unfamiliar, and crisis situations—precisely the 
kinds of situations Greene writes about—people cannot rely 
on personal culture to guide them. They must intentionally 
make their way. Thus Haidt is perhaps sufficient for 
explaining routine moral judgments (e.g., it is bad to steal), 
but the moment an unexpected element creeps into the situa-
tion (but I need the drug, which costs money I don’t have, to 
save my spouse),8 we need Greene. By calling attention to 
the fact that sometimes, “our conscious reasoning and gut 
feelings dialogue” (Greene 2017:67), the digital camera 
model can help explain when and why our automatic intu-
itions about morality are insufficient to guide our judgments, 
as well as what we do to overcome such dilemmas. It can 
also help us theorize the difference between how we feel and 
how we feel about how we feel (Damasio 1999; Wacquant 
2015), as well as the work we do to regulate our feelings 
(Hochschild 1979), including about moral violations (e.g., 
Feinberg et al. 2012; Schein and Gray 2018). Finally, the 
digital camera model can help us theorize mismatch between 
moral judgments and actions, such as when people behave in 
ways they feel are wrong but choose to do so anyway (e.g., 
Luft 2015:162–64). When it comes to moral cognition, 
sometimes, our “hot” and “fast” instincts are enough. But 
oftentimes, particularly in challenging situations, type II 
deliberation is necessary.
Consequently, a fruitful step for sociologists of morality 
involves reconsidering the dominance of Haidt’s elephant-
and-rider model, attending to Vaisey’s suggestion that delib-
erative processing may emerge not only after the fact but also 
in “unsettled” times when the “social and cultural ‘scaffold-
ing’” to which their practical consciousness has adapted has 
changed, and putting Greene’s ideas into conversation with 
the sociological research on the situational influences of cul-
ture on cognition. How does personal culture interact with 
and respond to novel situations and crises to shape whether 
humans engage in type I or type II cognitive processing to 
make moral judgments? Precisely how moral dilemmas get 
resolved and the relationship between this process and larger 
social dynamics ought to be a greater focus of our research. 
It is to this latter aspect of the culture-cognition nexus that I 
now turn.
Moral Judgment II: Culture in Thinking 
about People
There is a flaw in Haidt’s and Greene’s work that has been 
slowly creeping into our discipline and that should give us 
pause, compelling sociologists to bring even more of our 
tools to bear on psychological theories of moral judgment: 
both are insufficiently attentive to the ways social percep-
tion mediates moral judgment even though our evaluations 
6Although Reed (2016) theorizes that in political crises specifically, 
meanings that emerge in the buildup of crisis help guide action 
despite a lack of institutional guidance.
7Taking it even further, Bourdieu had his own term for the disruption 
caused by a mismatch between habitus and the external environ-
ment, hysteresis, and described the confusion an actor encounters 
when in a novel and unfamiliar situation as allodoxia.
8This example, of course, is a variant on Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
(1981) famous “Heinz dilemma,” in which a man whose wife is 
about to die is charged $2,000 for lifesaving medicine, which he 
does not have. The druggist refuses to sell it to him for less or to let 
him pay later, so the man breaks into the druggist’s laboratory and 
steals the medicine.
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of others are also influenced by embodied culture. In other 
words, the same person in the same situation can feel differ-
ently about the exact same behavior depending on the 
subject(s) involved in the interaction. This is because 
acquired moral dispositions relate not only to judgments of 
actions but also to judgments of people (Abend 2014:32). 
Furthermore, behavioral judgments and evaluations of peo-
ple often, if not always, intersect. Kunda (1999) was suc-
cinct: “the categories applied to people and behaviors can 
affect our expectations about people and our interpretations 
of their behavior” (p. 43). Hence, social perception is a nec-
essary feature of the cultural environment that needs greater 
consideration when examining situational influences on 
moral judgment.
To understand why the critical influence of social per-
ception has been lacking in research on cultural cognition, 
it is necessary to review the foundational experiments on 
which each model of moral judgment is founded. Haidt’s 
social intuitionist model stems from an analysis of 
responses to his now well-known vignette: Mark and 
Julie, college-age siblings, decide to engage in well-pro-
tected sex a single time as they travel to France on sum-
mer vacation. A majority of respondents to the vignette 
(80 percent) initially assert that this incestuous act is not 
okay; after some deliberation, the percentage drops a bit 
lower (68 percent) (Bjorklund, Haidt, and Murphy 2000; 
Haidt 2001, 2013). In another experiment, Haidt (2013:71) 
evaluated respondents’ emotional reactions to a woman 
who, when cleaning her closet, finds an old American 
flag. She does not want the flag anymore, so she cuts it 
into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom. And 
of course, in the citation that opened this article, Haidt 
wrote about the cognitive-emotional responses one is 
likely to associate with violence toward a child or by a 
woman against her father. What is rarely considered in 
these studies is how each of the imagined actors in Haidt’s 
experiments are strangers to the subjects doing the evalu-
ating (Bloom 2011:27)—and raced, gendered, and other-
wise categorizable strangers at that. Consequently, Haidt’s 
experiments might be calling forth moral evaluations on 
the basis of stereotypes about what membership in these 
categories mean. More precisely, social perception might 
be influencing the results of these studies without any 
explicit consideration of how.
For example, sociologists with expertise in correspon-
dence audit studies would be quick to point out that Mark 
and Julie are widely perceived as stereotypically white 
names. Others would note that Mark and Julie’s shared sta-
tus as college-age students on summer vacation in France 
connotes ideas about privilege and wealth. These classifi-
cations matter, because they can shape the emotional 
valence triggered in response to the dilemma. Had Mark 
and Julie been named Lakeisha and Jamal, and had they 
decided to practice incest while on a work break from their 
jobs at a call center, respondents with different social 
identities might react with more or less anger or disgust.9 If 
Mark and Julie were instead named Ethel and Bernard, pre-
sented as an elderly, lonely pair of siblings in an old-age 
home who decide to engage in intercourse to soothe their 
sadness, the vignette might elicit a tinge of pity along with 
repulsion. And what if the siblings were named Ethel and 
Lucille? Or what if the woman cleaning her bathroom with 
the American flag were, instead, a black man? It is easy to 
imagine, given the different interpretations Americans have 
expressed regarding football player Colin Kaepernick’s 
refusal to stand for the national anthem to protest police 
violence against African Americans, that how we catego-
rize subjects in research matters. Sociologists have long 
been attuned to this fact, and social neuroscience research 
on implicit bias provides additional validation for the idea 
that how we perceive others influences our automatic, type 
I evaluations of them and their actions (e.g., Gawronski and 
Payne 2010; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Nosek, Hawkins, 
and Frazier 2011; see also Shepherd 2011 and Lamont et al. 
2017 for useful sociological reviews of this work). Yet this 
attention to detail has been missing in the foundational 
models of moral judgment we have been incorporating into 
our theories.
Similarly, although Greene’s digital camera model pres-
ents an advantage over Haidt’s in its attention to contingency, 
it too neglects to consider how social perception mediates 
moral judgment. To develop his model, Greene examined a 
now classic battery of 40 moral dilemmas, including the 
well-known switch and footbridge renditions of the classic 
trolley problem (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976, 1985). In the 
switch case, a person has the option to flip a switch moving 
a runaway trolley from a path on which it will hit four work-
men onto another, where it will hit just one. In the footbridge 
case, a person has the option to push a large man off a foot-
bridge and onto the path of the runaway trolley, an action that 
will result in saving five workmen further down the track. 
How do people decide on the morally correct action? Greene 
et al. (2001) argued that such unfamiliar and challenging 
situations compel explicit evaluations of our moral princi-
ples: type II cognition.
However, what Greene fails to mention is how the descrip-
tions of subjects as “workmen” and “a stranger who happens 
to be very large” might be influencing his results. Moreover, 
in the original version of the trolley problem’s footbridge 
9The names Lakeisha and Jamal come from Bertrand and 
Mullainathan’s (2004) classic audit study demonstrating people 
with stereotypically black names are less likely to receive callbacks 
for job interviews than people with stereotypically white names, 
in this case Emily and Greg. That said, recent work suggests that 
whether a name is likely to be perceived as stereotypically black is 
influenced by other characteristics of the name, including “gender, 
popularity, type of last name included, and the average level of edu-
cation of mothers who commonly give that name, among others” 
(Gaddis 2017:485).
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variation, the man on the footbridge is described as “a fat 
man, a really fat man” (Thompson 1985:1409). In his book, 
Greene (2014:114) removed the phrasing of his 2001 study 
describing the stranger as “very large” and replaced it with a 
description of a man wearing a large backpack instead. This 
suggests that Greene knew that describing an imagined sub-
ject as a “stranger” versus a “man” and as someone wearing 
a “large backpack” versus someone who is “very large” has 
consequences for how respondents might interpret the 
vignette, but he did not discuss why he made these changes 
or whether he believed that they affected the results of his 
experiments.
Of course, as plenty of sociological research attests, fat 
bodies are perceived as problematic and bad, and fatness is 
highly stigmatized, leading fat people to be mocked, bullied, 
and discriminated against in multiple institutional contexts 
(Brewis 2014; Saguy 2012). Conversely, thinner bodies tend 
to be perceived as “morally, medically, aesthetically, and 
sexually desirable” (Saguy and Ward 2011:54). Likewise, 
gender affects how people are perceived and treated: in a 
recently released study of gender norms and inequalities, 
nearly 90 percent of men and women in 75 countries were 
found to display bias against women in politics, work, and 
education, and 28 percent considered it acceptable for a man 
to beat his wife (a proxy for beliefs about women’s physical 
integrity; Conceição et al. 2019). And what if we consider 
age? Presumably, the “workmen” in the switch and foot-
bridge experiments are of working age; this might elicit a 
mental image of an able-bodied man aged 25 to 65. But what 
if instead of a “really fat” or “very large” “workman” on the 
footbridge, respondents were told to imagine pushing a little 
girl in front of the trolley? Or if, instead of five workmen on 
the tracks, the victims were described as a group of five 
mixed-sex schoolchildren? Other experiments in Greene’s 
study ask if it is appropriate, as the head of a household in a 
developing country, to employ your daughter in child por-
nography to help feed your family, which also includes two 
sons, or—more mildly—whether it is acceptable as a recep-
tionist in a dentist’s office to arrange appointments for Mrs. 
Santiago and Mr. Morris in a way that privileges Mrs. 
Santiago’s needs. Even as he offered such variants, Greene 
offered no discussion about how each of these names, gen-
ders, or other descriptive modifiers matters.
Social Perception
In contrast, research on social perception explicitly examines 
the culturally informed cognitive mechanisms involved in 
recognizing socially significant information. In other words, 
it is about culture in thinking about people, and it is the first 
cognitive process involved in understanding the social world. 
Lizardo (2018) explained,
perception, at its most basic level, is simply identification and 
identification is specification. And specification is the product 
of a relation. That is, a world opens up for an organism when the 
organism is able to specify, and thus make “contact,” with that 
world in relation to itself.
Consequently, perception is about sense-making, and social 
perception is about sense-making for ourselves in relation to 
others. Perception is the primary building block of social cat-
egorization and classification, both cultural cognitive prac-
tices of evaluation learned and embodied through experience, 
observation, and practice.
Social categorization refers to the grouping of traits (fea-
tures of organisms) we believe belong together and in contra-
distinction to others (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 
2004; Lakoff 1987; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; Smith 
1990; Zerubavel 1996). This cognitive process of categoriza-
tion is common to all animals, yet humans are unique in that 
no human is born with preexisting knowledge of the social 
categories we use to make sense of our world. This does not 
mean that we do not recognize difference; as infants, we pre-
fer and recognize the gender of our primary caretakers, be 
they female or male (Quinn et al. 2002), and we prefer and 
recognize familiar versus unfamiliar accents (Kinzler, 
Dupoux, and Spelke 2007) as well as faces that are similar to 
ours in skin tone versus those that are not (Lee, Quinn, and 
Pascalis 2017). However, we are unable to associate these 
traits with the wider categories of woman and man or native 
and foreigner or even common social category rules about 
race until later (Hirschfeld 1998; Lee et al. 2017; Liberman, 
Woodward, and Kinzler 2017; Shutts, Pemberton Roben, and 
Spelke 2013). For example, white nine-month-olds tend to 
separate white faces into one category and black and Asian 
faces into another, suggesting that they can recognize their 
own skin-color category at this stage and that less familiar 
skin tones are lumped together into an “all other faces” cat-
egory (Lee et al. 2017:258). In contrast, white infants who 
are exposed equally to their own and other-race faces show 
no separate recognition or categorization of different “kinds” 
(Bar-Haim et al. 2006; Pauker et al. 2016). Humans are pre-
disposed to recognize some traits as different from others, 
and they are also predisposed to prefer those most similar to 
themselves, but how they understand the meanings of these 
traits and their relevance for social organization differs 
depending on the cultural environment in which humans are 
raised (Liberman et al. 2017).10
Following this, the second crucial component of culture 
in thinking about people is classification. Whereas categori-
zation is the “lumping and splitting” of people into different 
perceptual kinds (Zerubavel 1996), classification is the pro-
cess of giving categories content to allow us to 
extract meaning from them, to communicate with them, and 
10Although importantly, younger children are more likely to catego-
rize gender and language but not race as a natural kind, and cultural 
differences in the perceived flexibility of social categories manifest 
with age (Kinzler and Dautel 2012; Rhodes and Gelman 2009).
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to generalize from one experience to another (Kunda 1999). 
Categorization is descriptive; classification is substantive 
(Bowker and Star 1999). Classification helps us compare 
people not simply on the basis of their observable similarities 
or differences but also on the basis of their presumed intrin-
sic and essential similarities or differences. Marion Fourcade 
(2016:176) referred to this as “nominal classification”: clas-
sificatory judgments that describe inherent characteristics 
and relations. Following this, classification allows us to 
make inferences about people we perceive on the basis of 
culturally learned ideas about what kinds of characteristics 
are associated with what kinds of people. This, in turn, helps 
us determine how to relate to them (Brubaker et al. 2004).
Ostensibly, nominal classification schemes can result in 
horizontal divisions between social(ly constructed) kinds, 
but in practice, they are almost always tied to ordinal judg-
ments—classification schemes that attribute value to the 
kinds so defined (Fourcade 2016:178)—and we frequently 
use these judgments to vertically rank different categories of 
people (Fourcade 2016:178; see also Brubaker 2015). Such 
rankings are far from benign (Bowker and Star 1999; 
Bourdieu 1990b). As a growing body of research reveals, 
those we classify as highly valuable are also those to whom 
we accord high status. We respect and perceive them as good 
and admirable, and we reward them with symbolic and mate-
rial resources. In contrast, those we classify as less valuable 
are accorded lower status. We disrespect and perceive them 
as bad, unworthy, and even deplorable, and we punish them 
by inhibiting their access to material and symbolic resources 
(Lamont 1992, 2000, 2018; Prasad et al. 2009; Ridgeway 
2006). Subsequently, classification is related to moral judg-
ment because how we classify categories of people informs 
how we think and feel we ought to treat them (Lamont 2018).
Finally, although often attended to in our discipline from 
the perspective of practice—that is, how categorization and 
classification schemes organize the world socially and politi-
cally through time and space—cognitive research on social 
perception attends to how these practices become acquired 
and influence judgment and action typically without our 
explicit awareness (Lamont 2012:205).11 In fact, we rarely 
perceive people and then parse through their various descrip-
tive traits before determining to which category they belong, 
nor do we reflect on various classification schemes before 
deciding how to react to those people. Rather, social percep-
tion is beholden to the same two cognitive processes 
described earlier. Most of the time, when we see others, our 
categorization and classification processes automatically 
activate (Amodio and Mendoza 2010; Fiske and Neuberg 
1990). Fast, efficient, type I cognitive processes guide the 
majority of social perception and help resolve the “bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion” of our world (Brubaker 2002:71). 
Thus as we find ourselves moving from one setting to 
another, evaluating different people in different positions, 
cognitive associations as acquired dispositions trigger in 
response to our social perceptions.
That said, and much like Greene’s model, there are times 
when type I cognition is insufficient to guide our evaluations 
of others, and more deliberate, type II cognition is necessary 
(Ito and Tomelleri 2017). In particular, people most often use 
fast, automatic, heuristic-based processes to perceive others, 
but when others don’t “fit” known categories, they use a 
slow, deliberate, rational approach (Fiske and Taylor 
2013:109). As a result, intentional type II deliberate pro-
cesses can be activated (1) in cases of failed interactions in 
which there is mismatch between our expectations and real-
ity (Macrae et al. 1999); (2) when category membership is 
ambiguous, thus prompting a concerted effort to think 
through how to categorize and classify the perceived 
(Freeman and Ambady 2011; Freeman et al. 2011); and (3) 
when we intentionally want to control our perceptions of oth-
ers, for example, to suppress unwanted stereotypes because 
of conflicting personal value commitments to equality 
(Amodio and Devine 2010; Amodio and Swencionis 2018; 
Blair 2002; Devine 1989; Eberhardt 2019; Macrae and 
Bodenhausen 2000). Each of these examples is similar to 
Greene’s (2009) argument about the introduction of type II 
cognition in novel or challenging situations, thereby helping 
actors override automatic responses to, in this case, percep-
tual dilemmas before determining a response. Thus, once 
again, depending on the features of the situation and the 
goals of the perceiver, higher order processes can modulate 
categorization and classification as well as the link between 
them (Freeman and Ambady 2011).12 In turn, scholarly atten-
tion to the social features of situations and, in particular, to 
the social characteristics of people involved in situations, can 
generate more precise theories of moral judgment.
The following section probes the argument above with the 
example of the moral machine experiment, a recent iteration 
of the trolley problem in which the subjects of the actions have 
been varied. I then conclude with a discussion that reiterates 
the proposal herein: sociological theories of moral judgment 
have much to gain by moving beyond the dominance of 
Haidt’s elephant-and-rider model in our research 
11Lamont (2012) explained, “[Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation] 
focuses on (e)valuation as it happens not inside the mind of an indi-
vidual (the primary concern of cognitive psychology), but in prac-
tices and experiences, in what people spend their time doing, through 
latent or explicit dialogues with specific or generalized others (often 
made available through cultural repertoires)” (p. 205).
12Of course, like all social practices, with time, practice, and expe-
rience, even deliberate modes of perception can become automa-
tized through habituation: type II cognition becomes type I as 
explicit deliberations become implicit reactions (Turner 2018:137). 
Although a full review of the research on habituation is beyond the 
scope of this article, the main point here is that through habituation 
processes, new modes of vision and division can become acquired 
with practical consequences, including, of course, for our judg-
ments of actions. In learning to perceive people anew, our evalua-
tions of behaviors concerning them can change as well.
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and considering Greene’s model, which emphasizes the 
importance of attending to situational variation, in our analy-
ses. Simultaneously, we also have much to gain by consider-
ing the crucial mediating influence of social perception in our 
research on morality, often neglected in psychological theories 
of moral judgment but central to sociological understandings 
of how categorization and classification practices shape 
human thought and action in times of normalcy and in times of 
crisis. As sociologists, one of the strongest contributions to the 
study of morality we can make is greater attention to how 
social features of situations affect moral judgment.
The Moral Machine Experiment
Slightly more than a year ago, a paper was published in 
Nature reporting the results of a study of self-driving cars 
(Awad et al. 2018).13 Developed by the MIT Media Lab, the 
purpose of the study was to crowd-source individuals’ deci-
sions on how cars should prioritize lives in potentially dan-
gerous scenarios. This included different variations of the 
trolley problem, including whether it was more ethical for a 
self-driving car to strike and kill men versus women, humans 
versus pets, children versus the elderly, fit versus unfit, doc-
tors versus criminals, and so on.14 The experiment went viral, 
and millions of people in 233 countries and territories 
recorded a total of 39.62 million decisions by the time the 
results were published.
The results of the moral machine experiment revealed sig-
nificant cross-country variation, not simply in how likely 
people were to suggest that an autonomous vehicle should 
kill one or a few to save others (similar to the classic trolley 
experiment) but also in what kinds of people (or nonhuman 
animals, in the case of pets) were more worth saving. The 
results also showed slight but not significant variation in 
results depending on respondents’ demographics (age, edu-
cational attainment, gender, income, political and religious 
views) and the experimenters were able to generate three 
geographic clusters of countries with different moral prefer-
ences based on their findings as well as other clusters based 
on countries’ economic characteristics and cultural values.
For example, people worldwide tended to prefer saving 
more versus fewer people, but the magnitude of this prefer-
ence was stronger in countries with individualistic cultures 
such as France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada than in countries with collectivist cultures such as 
Japan, Taiwan, and China. Participants from individualistic 
countries were also more likely to prefer sparing youth 
(depicted as babies, little girls and boys, and pregnant women), 
whereas those in collectivist countries were more willing to 
spare the elderly. People from countries with higher gross 
domestic products and stronger civic institutions, such as 
Finland and Japan, tended to prefer saving legal road crossers 
versus jaywalkers compared with those in poorer countries 
with weaker institutions, such as Nigeria and Pakistan. In 
countries with greater economic equality (Finland, again), 
people showed little preference for saving homeless persons 
versus executives, whereas in countries with more inequality 
(e.g., Colombia), respondents were more likely to choose kill-
ing the person of lower status. Finally, although individual 
demographic variations did not significantly affect responses 
below the .01 value, the most notable effects were that men 
were .06 percent less inclined to save women overall, and 
those who self-identified as “very religious” were .09 percent 
more likely to save humans over pets.
The moral machine experiment was designed to evalu-
ate the ethical judgments of decisions made by autono-
mous vehicles in unavoidable accident scenarios, but in 
the process, it uncovered significant cross-cultural varia-
tions in how people assess the worth of different kinds of 
life. By asking people all over the world to decide who 
must be spared and sacrificed, and by varying the charac-
teristics of the subjects in each experiment, the findings of 
the study not only revealed geographic variations in pref-
erences for moral behaviors (killing vs. saving), it also 
revealed within-country variations in who or what kinds 
of people these preferences are for. Hence, the results of 
the study demonstrate one aspect of the argument in this 
article: although moral judgments of the same action 
depend in part on the broader cultural context, a point 
made by Haidt and many sociologists as well, they also 
depend on the social characteristics of those involved in 
the situation. In other words, the same action, when 
enacted against differently categorized people, can be 
considered more or less moral by the same individual. 
Respondents’ moral judgments change depending on the 
subjects involved in the experiment. This suggests that 
culture in thinking about people matters, and it is impor-
tant for scholars to attend to the social features of situa-
tions when researching morality.
Simultaneously, there is room for improvement with the 
moral machine experiment and space for sociologists to 
contribute even more. For example, the moral machine 
researchers are unable to show whether their version of the 
trolley problem compelled implicit or explicit thinking 
about action or whether, with repeat experience, people 
moved faster through each situational variation as they 
adapted to the challenge of choosing whom to save and 
whom to kill.15 Alternatively, as the social characteristics of 
the people involved in each situation changed, subjects may 
have taken more time to determine a response. Lengthier 
deliberations in such cases could be the result of repeatedly 
13I thank Laura K. Nelson for drawing my attention to this study.
14The full range of scenarios can be browsed at http://moralma-
chine.mit.edu.
15For example, in my study of behavioral variation in the Rwandan 
genocide (Luft 2015), I found that with time and experience, civil-
ian participants “cognitively adapted” to how it felt to kill neighbors 
(see also Luft 2020).
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having to choose between multiple categories of people 
with culturally “high” moral value (e.g., three boys and two 
men vs. five elderly women, followed by one elderly 
woman, a man, and a boy vs. a man, a woman, and a baby), 
or the result of being unable, in some instances, to discern to 
what category an individual or group of individuals 
belonged. According to the arguments herein, both situa-
tions would disrupt implicit judgments of right and wrong 
and compel lengthier, explicit deliberations.
Additionally, although we have information about the 
sociodemographic characteristics of test-takers, it is unclear 
which aspects of their social identities were relevant for their 
judgments, how they may or may not have intersected 
depending on the scenario considered, or if an altogether dif-
ferent aspect of their social identity mattered more. For 
example, a respondent could be a parent, recently unem-
ployed, or someone who identifies with or is frequently iden-
tified by others as belonging to a racialized minority. We all 
have many ways of thinking about ourselves, far beyond the 
categories examined in this experiment. Which identity 
drives our moral judgment, and how identity matters for 
moral judgment, including the moral judgment of other peo-
ple’s value and worth, depends on the situation we are in. As 
a result, different social characteristics can become more or 
less moralized at different moments in time, even for the 
same individual, shifting the perceived morality or immoral-
ity of different actions. Knowing a person’s sociodemo-
graphic characteristics can only get us so far. We must also 
attend to what they mean for different people, and how their 
meanings can change contingent on situations, altering moral 
judgment in turn.
A final concern with the moral machine experiment is that 
we know nothing about the real-world situations in which the 
experiments were done. Granted, respondents were told to 
imagine themselves as having “control over choosing what 
the car should do,” but presumably, even this exercise would 
have been affected by respondents’ situational environments 
when they clicked “keep going and hit the pedestrians” or 
“swerve and hit the pedestrians on the other lane.” Were 
respondents alone at home in front of their computers when 
they did the experiment, or were they out with friends, pass-
ing time and making choices as a group while reading 
through the dilemmas on their cell phones? What about 
respondents who did the experiment as passengers in the 
back of a cab versus those who enacted judgments absent-
mindedly while crossing the street? Given the sensitivity of 
replicability to context (Van Bavel et al. 2016) and priming 
(Bargh and Chartrand 2000), it is easy to imagine how such 
simple and seemingly insignificant variations could in fact 
be very significant for shaping judgments about the targets of 
self-driving cars.16
The moral machine experiment is no panacea. It cannot 
tell us about the extent to which each variation was or was 
not perceived as an unfamiliar or challenging dilemma, com-
pelling implicit versus explicit cognition, or whether some 
aspects of respondents’ social identities were more or less 
salient at the time they did the experiment, shaping their 
evaluations as well. We also do not know how the real-world 
situations respondents were in when they made their choices 
might have affected their judgments. What the moral machine 
experiment can tell us is that the social characteristics of sub-
jects in imaginary moral dilemmas matter, suggesting that in 
real life, the social features of situations matter too. This is a 
start worthy of further empirical investigation. Sociologists, 
who are especially attuned to how situations and social per-
ceptions are culturally informed, can be at the forefront of 
this exciting research.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article I argue that moral judgments are determined by 
actions, situations, and relationships. Dual-process theories 
of morality emphasize that morality is often experienced as a 
gut reaction that tells us something is wrong, while recogniz-
ing that “our guts learn their intuitions” (Hitlin and Harkness 
2018:49; Sapolsky 2017:508). Sociological research that 
builds on or relates to these ideas considers how cross-cul-
tural variation, with culture often standing in for geography 
or social groups, alters moral judgments with important con-
sequences for what is and is not considered moral behavior. 
Yet missing from these approaches is the idea that, depend-
ing on the features of the situation and especially the social 
features of the situation, the same behavior judged by the 
same person can be considered more or less moral. Moreover, 
as various situational dilemmas “crop up” in the external 
environment, our moral judgments can shift from fast and 
automatic to slow and deliberate as we strive to make sense 
of others’, or even our own, actions. Many of us behave in 
some situations in ways we would not consider acceptable in 
others. This suggests that our moral judgments are much less 
internally stable than current theories allow. Subsequently, 
how we evaluate the morality, immorality, or even the moral 
relevance of an action also depends on features of the situa-
tion, including how familiar or novel it is, and on the per-
ceived social categories of the subjects involved in the 
interaction.
Sociologists, of course, have long been attuned to how 
different situations call forth different meanings and inter-
pretations and subsequent emotions and actions. We have 
also long been attuned to how categorization and classifica-
tion practices affect judgments of worth and value. But in 
the recent turn toward cultural cognitive understandings of 
morality, some of these insights have been left behind. This 
article traces this neglect to the growing reliance in our dis-
cipline on Haidt’s social intuitionist model, which no longer 
dominates in psychology but continues to drive much of the 
16Of course, all this has to do with culture and dual-process modes 
of cognition as well, but given the focus of this article, I will leave 
such theorizing aside.
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research on dual-process theorizing about morality in soci-
ology. I therefore introduce Greene’s digital camera model 
as an alternative perspective, especially insofar as situa-
tional variations are concerned, and also connect Greene to 
a wide body of research in sociology on culture, cognition, 
and crisis, to suggest that theories of morality ought to dis-
tinguish between familiar and unfamiliar dilemmas in their 
research.
Simultaneously, I argue that neither Haidt nor Greene 
goes far enough in considering what influences moral judg-
ment, and this is because neither considers the crucial 
mediating influence of social perception. Defined and 
explained here as the cognitive process that undergirds cul-
tural practices of social categorization and classification, I 
review how both Haidt and Greene’s models hinge on 
experiments in which their subjects are raced, classed, gen-
dered, and otherwise described in ways that might alter 
respondents’ judgments of their actions. Yet neither exam-
ines how the perceived category membership of subjects 
might affect respondents’ moral judgments. Sociologists, 
who are experts in considering how socially constructed 
categories influence judgments and actions, have much to 
contribute here. But first, we must slow down our uncritical 
incorporation of these theories and consider, using our dis-
tinct disciplinary perspective, the possible flaws in the 
premises of their studies.
Finally, I assess the moral machine experiment con-
ducted by the MIT Media Lab to illustrate different aspects 
of my argument. The goal of the moral machine experiment 
is to determine what ethical principles ought to guide 
machine behavior in the case of self-driving cars. In 
researchers’ variation of the trolley problem, they con-
fronted respondents with unavoidable accident scenarios in 
which an autonomous vehicle could either stay on course 
and kill some people or swerve and kill others. Participants 
were given 13 accidents to evaluate, and in each, the sub-
jects who could be killed or saved were altered. Hence, 
much of the situation stayed the same, but in changing the 
characteristics of those who could be spared or harmed, the 
experimenters found significant differences in how actors 
evaluated the rightfulness or wrongfulness of killing. The 
morality of the action depended on respondents’ evalua-
tions of people involved in the dilemma. This finding vali-
dates a central argument in this article: that social perception 
shapes moral judgment.
Simultaneously, the experiment does not go far enough 
in its considerations of other arguments herein. In particu-
lar, it could be improved with greater attention to timing 
and thus whether different judgments were made “fast” or 
“slow” or even changed from fast to slow (or vice versa) 
depending on the social characteristics of the people 
involved. It could also be improved by considering that 
people identify with multiple and intersecting social cate-
gories and whether any particular aspect of one’s identity 
triggers as relevant for shaping judgment depends on fea-
tures of the situation as well. I have discussed this only 
briefly in this article, but how people categorize them-
selves and how such self-categorizations vary is absolutely 
an important feature of moral judgment worthy of further 
theorizing. Finally, it would help to know the real-world 
details of the situations people were in when they partici-
pated in the experiment, as recent assessments of psycho-
logical research show the sensitivity of replicability to 
context and priming. The importance of understanding 
morality in its “natural” context is something many soci-
ologists have written about (e.g., Hitlin and Vaisey 2013) 
and an obvious challenge for experiments such as the 
moral machine, which can only get us so far.
Consequently, my analysis of the moral machine experi-
ment demonstrates the argument at the heart of this article 
and also where, as a discipline, we have much to contribute 
to research on morality. In particular, sociologists are well 
placed to examine how anytime an individual makes a 
moral judgment, his or her sense of right or wrong is deter-
mined by three factors: (1) the action itself, (2) the situation 
in which the action is performed, and (3) the people 
involved in the interaction. This focus on actions, situa-
tions, and relationships joins together culture in thinking 
about action with culture in thinking about people, and in 
so doing, it extends contemporary trends in cultural cogni-
tive sociology with recent developments in psychological 
research on morality as well as timeworn insights from our 
own discipline: that the cultural features of situations, 
including and especially the social features of situations, 
shape our judgments and actions. Hence, future research on 
morality ought to more fully consider the nexus of actions, 
situations, and relationships in their analyses. In combining 
existing research on moral cognition with sociological 
understandings of how situations and social perceptions 
affect judgment, we can begin to craft a fuller picture of the 
axes of human behavior.
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